Trobaugh and his staff were understandably distracted by establishing a tactical operations center in the airhead and picking up the threads of a battle already in progress. The intelligence available was sketchy, complicating plans and making any rehearsals impossible.Although time was pressing, the real issue in preparing the interven- tion was not so much the lack of planning time but the lack of quality planning in the time available. On the morning of 1 November, the marines, responding to the chance that a few die-hards had established themselves on the nearby islands off Carriacou, stormed ashore on the main island but found only a small garrison that had already shed its uniforms and blended into the general population.
Officials began to contemplate a noncombatant evacuation of American citizens. Admiral McDonald’s naval staff briefed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John W. Vessey on using a combination of fleet warships, elements of a Marine amphibious unit, and, if necessary, one reinforced airborne battalion for a show of force.
the US military. It exacted, however, a heavy operational and logistical price by impeding the ability of the Air Force to build up men and materiel in the airhead quickly.Unlike most similar operations in the past, the attack on Grenada was also a joint operation, and in the previous decade the U.S. Army and Navy had not had many opportunities to plan and conduct such opera- tions.
He had only given up command of the 1st Battalion (Rangers) the previous May and was well known to both battalion commanders and their staffs. Only 133 square miles in size, Grenada had a population of almost 100,000 in 1983. Shipped to Angola, he died there in 1986. There were no U.S. casualties.
Previous military operations, especially involving the potential rescue of hostages, had more time for planning. Their armor and armament made them formi- dable weapons platforms. Although elements of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) were alerted for a possible mission to reinforce the two 82d Airborne Division brigades already on the island, that was soon canceled. The camp was finished on 3 November, just in time for the Cubans to begin their repatriation process the next day. Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham went further and directed the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to prepare an in-depth analysis of the operation.
Using two-man teams to clear the vehicles that the Cubans had parked on the runway (in some cases conveniently leaving the keys in the igni- tion), the Rangers were able to ready the airfield to receive planes. He says that the U.S. armed forces came extremely close to a major political defeat due to poor planning on the part of senior officers.
Readiness Command and, for a while, U.S.
The Rangers retained custody of the detainees for only a few hours before they turned them over to the lead elements of a 300-man Caribbean Peacekeeping Force arriving in an Air Force C–130. The reason for his inability to modify this aspect was because the Joint Chiefs wanted to keep the methods and organization of U.S. counterterrorist units secret and were pressuring him to redeploy the Joint Special Operations Command and the special units it controlled before the news media arrived.
The plan that resulted, while flawed, achieved the desired outcome. Assisted by circling Air Force AC–130 Spectre gunships, the Rangers hit the ground, returned fire, and set up their command post. Urgent FUry was not unique in this regard.The frail security of the perimeter protecting the airfield was underscored by an incident about 1530. As they continued on toward the Cubans’ construction camp, they took an additional twenty-two prisoners. The last of the 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry, reached the airstrip before dusk, and the follow-on 3d Battalion of the 32th was in place early on the twenty-sixth.
Bishop and several of his prominent supporters were captured, lined up against a wall, and executed.
These casualties, when added to the 25 Cubans killed and 59 wounded and 45 Grenadians killed and 358 wounded, underscore just how costly a short, intense, no-notice operation could be.