D i ma y a I n A p r i l o f 2 0 1 8 t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e me C o u r t , i n S e s s i o n s v . L. Rev.
NOEL J. FRANCISCO Solicitor General . Respondent James Garcia Dimaya, a citizen of the Philippines, immigrated to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1992 at the age of thirteen. After being convicted twice of burglary under a California statute, he was placed in removal proceedings. But this is not a meaningful limitation: In the ordinary case of any offense, the riskiness of a crime arises from events occurring during its commission, not events occurring later. Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 205300001- SupremeCtBriefs @usdoj.gov (202) 514-2217 (I) TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)..... 1 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) ..... 5 Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) ..... 1 Shuti v… [A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime … for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime—The term "crime of violence" means—(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;Although all these various activities occurred at the periphery of—and, in some cases, with the intent to support—violent actions undertaken by others, including co-conspirators and LET members, there is insufficient evidence in this record that these actions involved either [the defendant]'s actual use of force or a substantial risk that [the defendant] would use force. Brief for Petitioner 31. 132 Harv. Counsel of Record . § 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act’s provisions governing an alien’s removal from the United States, is unconstitutionally vague. While Dimaya’s petition was pending in the Ninth Circuit, the United States Supreme Court ruled in the case of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), that the definition of “crime of violence” under the Armed Career Criminal Act's residual clause, which … On two separate occasions, in 2007 and 2009, Dimaya was convicted in California of first-degree residential burglary and was sentenced to two years in prison.Is 18 U.S.C. Since entering the country, Dimaya has attended high school and community college as well as held several jobs. Issue Brief: The Implications of Sessions v. Dimaya B a c k g r o u n d o n S e s s i o ns v . In August, two convicted terrorists were released from prison unexpectedly early. This case caused waves because the left-leaning justices split with right-leaning justices evenly at 4-4 and the deciding vote was the freshman justice Gorsuch. Sessions v. Dimaya,3 the Supreme Court took the next logical step, ap- plying its vagueness analysis, set forth in Johnson v. United States,4 to a provision of the criminal code incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act5 (INA). (A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.© 2020 The Lawfare Institute[T]he term "crime of violence" means an offense that is a felony and—(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and